ATTACK METHOD
Targeted Email & Phishing — Techniques That Beat MFA
Fake login pages, adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM), BEC, and quishing: how email and SMS steal credentials and sessions. Japan's 730,000 reports, and what works.
Phishing is the longest-lived intrusion technique. DBIR 2026 keeps it at 16% of initial access vectors, while "pretexting" — scams built on fabricated premises — grew to 6%, feeding ransomware and extortion. Japan logged about 730,000 phishing reports in the first half of 2026; by press accounts roughly 45% of the delivery servers sat in Chinese networks.
The technique has evolved from "type your password into a fake page" to adversary-in-the-middle attacks that defeat multi-factor authentication. In AiTM, the attacker's server proxies the real login screen in real time — the user completes genuine MFA, and the attacker steals the resulting session cookie.
In our incident data, phishing-initiated leaks are few in number, but severity spikes when a single case turns into business email compromise with payment authority, or into follow-on unauthorized access.
The numbers
16%
Phishing's share of initial access worldwide (DBIR 2026, flat)
~730,000
Phishing reports in Japan, H1 2026 (National Police Agency)
6%
Pretexting share, expanding (DBIR 2026)
Techniques explained
Fake login pages (credential harvesting)
The classic: a near-perfect copy of the login page collects IDs and passwords. Stolen pairs feed credential stuffing and underground markets. Domains one character off (including punycode IDN abuse) are the norm.
Adversary-in-the-middle phishing (AiTM)
The attacker-hosted page relays to the real site in real time, so the user completes genuine MFA. The attacker then steals the post-authentication session cookie and impersonates the user — the textbook breaker of "we have MFA, we're safe".
Business email compromise (BEC)
Executives or suppliers are impersonated to demand urgent transfers. Often involving no system compromise (or a stolen mailbox), it evades technical detection; losses equal the transferred amount. Splitting payment-change approvals across several people is the most effective control.
QR code phishing (quishing)
A QR code in email opens the fake page on the victim's phone, bypassing URL filtering on the work PC — and vigilance drops on personal devices.
Session cookie theft
Steal the cookie that keeps a post-authentication session alive, and neither password nor MFA matters. It is both the delivery mechanism of AiTM and a favorite of infostealers harvesting stored cookies and tokens. Raising MFA resilience means pairing it with hardware tokens (FIDO2).
Attack flow (kill chain)
- Send a convincing business email or SMS
- Capture credentials on a fake login or application form
- Use the stolen credentials to enter the real system
Targeted data: Login credentials; payment and contract approval authority
Trends & discussion
As the NPA's analysis showed, about 45% of the delivery infrastructure for Japan's ~730,000 reports sits abroad, mainly in Chinese networks. Meanwhile AI-generated text has erased the once-telltale awkward Japanese, making fraudulent mail harder to spot.
The strongest technical countermeasure is phishing-resistant authentication. FIDO2/passkeys never send credentials to a fake site, neutralizing most phishing including AiTM. Pair them with business rules for payments and contract changes (multi-approval, callback by phone) to counter BEC.
Countermeasures
For individuals & small businesses
- Never log in from links in email or SMS — open the official site yourself
- Do important procedures from bookmarks, not URLs
- For transfer requests, always call back on a known number (never trust the message alone)
For organizations (IT)
- Prioritize FIDO2/passkeys and migrate away from SMS one-time passwords
- Require multi-person approval and verbal confirmation for payment and contract changes (BEC countermeasure)
- Rewrite URLs at the gateway, sandbox attachments, and build a reporting culture for suspicious mail
- Run targeted email drills regularly — measure report rate, not open rate
Step-by-step guidance by protection level is in the guide →
Targeted email & phishing incidents we collected (12, by impact)
| Company / organization | Disclosed | Scale | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| カインドオル(ECサイト) | September 1, 2026 | 136,464 people | S |
| Axcelead Drug Discovery Partners株式会社 | July 21, 2026 | 7,000 records | S |
| 株式会社講談社 | August 2, 2026 | 3,812 records | B |
| 株式会社マリモホールディングス | March 5, 2026 | 1,360 people | B |
| 株式会社じほう | February 25, 2026 | 890 records | B |
| 株式会社八十二長野銀行 | October 18, 2026 | 672 records | B |
| 東京都立大学(教員のGoogleアカウント) | January 7, 2026 | 423 records | S |
| 株式会社JEMS | March 25, 2026 | 223 records | S |
| 日経BP | October 3, 2026 | 26 records | B |
| 日本エネルギー経済研究所 | October 1, 2026 | 13 records | S |
| 山口大学(教職員メール) | October 5, 2026 | 1 accounts | S |
| 東京計器株式会社 | April 26, 2026 | Unknown | S |
Related attack methods
Attack Methods & Trends (Verizon DBIR 2026, CrowdStrike GTR 2026, NPA / Kyodo, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and others). For individual incidents, see the source links on each incident page.