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ATTACK METHOD

Targeted Email & Phishing — Techniques That Beat MFA

Fake login pages, adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM), BEC, and quishing: how email and SMS steal credentials and sessions. Japan's 730,000 reports, and what works.

Collected incidents: 12Total scale: ~15 peopleAll methods: Attack Methods & Trends

Phishing is the longest-lived intrusion technique. DBIR 2026 keeps it at 16% of initial access vectors, while "pretexting" — scams built on fabricated premises — grew to 6%, feeding ransomware and extortion. Japan logged about 730,000 phishing reports in the first half of 2026; by press accounts roughly 45% of the delivery servers sat in Chinese networks.

The technique has evolved from "type your password into a fake page" to adversary-in-the-middle attacks that defeat multi-factor authentication. In AiTM, the attacker's server proxies the real login screen in real time — the user completes genuine MFA, and the attacker steals the resulting session cookie.

In our incident data, phishing-initiated leaks are few in number, but severity spikes when a single case turns into business email compromise with payment authority, or into follow-on unauthorized access.

The numbers

16%

Phishing's share of initial access worldwide (DBIR 2026, flat)

~730,000

Phishing reports in Japan, H1 2026 (National Police Agency)

6%

Pretexting share, expanding (DBIR 2026)

Techniques explained

Fake login pages (credential harvesting)

The classic: a near-perfect copy of the login page collects IDs and passwords. Stolen pairs feed credential stuffing and underground markets. Domains one character off (including punycode IDN abuse) are the norm.

Adversary-in-the-middle phishing (AiTM)

The attacker-hosted page relays to the real site in real time, so the user completes genuine MFA. The attacker then steals the post-authentication session cookie and impersonates the user — the textbook breaker of "we have MFA, we're safe".

Business email compromise (BEC)

Executives or suppliers are impersonated to demand urgent transfers. Often involving no system compromise (or a stolen mailbox), it evades technical detection; losses equal the transferred amount. Splitting payment-change approvals across several people is the most effective control.

QR code phishing (quishing)

A QR code in email opens the fake page on the victim's phone, bypassing URL filtering on the work PC — and vigilance drops on personal devices.

Session cookie theft

Steal the cookie that keeps a post-authentication session alive, and neither password nor MFA matters. It is both the delivery mechanism of AiTM and a favorite of infostealers harvesting stored cookies and tokens. Raising MFA resilience means pairing it with hardware tokens (FIDO2).

Attack flow (kill chain)

  1. Send a convincing business email or SMS
  2. Capture credentials on a fake login or application form
  3. Use the stolen credentials to enter the real system

Targeted data: Login credentials; payment and contract approval authority

Trends & discussion

As the NPA's analysis showed, about 45% of the delivery infrastructure for Japan's ~730,000 reports sits abroad, mainly in Chinese networks. Meanwhile AI-generated text has erased the once-telltale awkward Japanese, making fraudulent mail harder to spot.

The strongest technical countermeasure is phishing-resistant authentication. FIDO2/passkeys never send credentials to a fake site, neutralizing most phishing including AiTM. Pair them with business rules for payments and contract changes (multi-approval, callback by phone) to counter BEC.

Countermeasures

For individuals & small businesses

  • Never log in from links in email or SMS — open the official site yourself
  • Do important procedures from bookmarks, not URLs
  • For transfer requests, always call back on a known number (never trust the message alone)

For organizations (IT)

  • Prioritize FIDO2/passkeys and migrate away from SMS one-time passwords
  • Require multi-person approval and verbal confirmation for payment and contract changes (BEC countermeasure)
  • Rewrite URLs at the gateway, sandbox attachments, and build a reporting culture for suspicious mail
  • Run targeted email drills regularly — measure report rate, not open rate

Step-by-step guidance by protection level is in the guide →

Targeted email & phishing incidents we collected (12, by impact)

Company / organizationDisclosedScaleSeverity
カインドオル(ECサイト)September 1, 2026136,464 peopleS
Axcelead Drug Discovery Partners株式会社July 21, 20267,000 recordsS
株式会社講談社August 2, 20263,812 recordsB
株式会社マリモホールディングスMarch 5, 20261,360 peopleB
株式会社じほうFebruary 25, 2026890 recordsB
株式会社八十二長野銀行October 18, 2026672 recordsB
東京都立大学(教員のGoogleアカウント)January 7, 2026423 recordsS
株式会社JEMSMarch 25, 2026223 recordsS
日経BPOctober 3, 202626 recordsB
日本エネルギー経済研究所October 1, 202613 recordsS
山口大学(教職員メール)October 5, 20261 accountsS
東京計器株式会社April 26, 2026UnknownS

Related attack methods

Attack Methods & Trends (Verizon DBIR 2026, CrowdStrike GTR 2026, NPA / Kyodo, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and others). For individual incidents, see the source links on each incident page.

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