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JAENES

ATTACK METHODS

Attack Methods & Trends

We auto-classified the 471 incidents collected on this site by attack method, based on the wording of official disclosures. See how data is actually leaking, with counts and representative cases, alongside official Japanese statistics and the latest global threat reports.

Incidents by method (471 total)

Classification is automated from disclosure wording. Compound incidents are counted under the more specific method; incidents without a disclosed cause fall under "Under investigation".

MethodCountShareSummary
Unauthorized access (method undisclosed)166
35%
Breached, but the technique was not identified or disclosed
Under investigation / not stated94
20%
Cause not disclosed
Supply chain attacks (via vendors & shared services)49
10%
Compromising the provider instead of the user
Ransomware46
10%
Encrypting data and demanding a ransom
Exploitation of vulnerabilities39
8%
Breaking in through holes in software and devices
Abuse of credentials28
6%
Logging in legitimately with leaked or guessed passwords
Misdirected sending & disclosure (human error)20
4%
Leaks caused by wrong recipients or exposure settings
Targeted email & phishing12
3%
Fake emails and sites that steal credentials
Misconfiguration & access-control gaps11
2%
Data left readable by anyone
Loss & theft5
1%
Physical loss of devices and media
System defects1
0%
Bugs that expose other users' data

In October 2026 alone there were 219 disclosures, with supply-chain intrusions and undisclosed-method attacks surging.

Method-by-method explanation

Each method's mechanism, typical flow, targeted data, key countermeasures, and representative incidents from our collection.

Unauthorized access (method undisclosed)

166 incidents

Unauthorized access by a third party is confirmed, but the specific technique (vulnerability, credentials, email, etc.) has not been disclosed. Cases move to other categories as investigations progress.

Observed techniques

Dormant account creationLog tampering and deletionSecuring remote access

Typical flow

  1. Signs of intrusion are detected
  2. The scope of impact is investigated
  3. Disclosure covers what is known; the cause often remains under investigation

Targeted data: Varies by incident

Key countermeasures: Log preservation and monitoring, early consultation with experts(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Under investigation / not stated

94 incidents

At the initial announcement the cause is listed as under investigation. Cases are reclassified as follow-ups clarify. Japan's disclosure-driven reporting means this share is high.

Observed techniques

Under investigation (reclassified when determined)

Typical flow

  1. A possible leak is detected
  2. Investigation of cause and scope continues
  3. A confirmed follow-up is published

Targeted data: —

Key countermeasures: Prompt initial reporting, consultation with specialists(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Shared services — reservations, e-commerce platforms, email delivery — and outsourcing vendors are attacked, and the damage cascades to every company that entrusted them with data. Japan saw this pattern repeatedly in autumn 2026, with single incidents affecting tens of millions of records.

Observed techniques

Compromise of the provider's systemPoisoning update channels and distribution pipelinesAbuse of API keys and access tokensBulk theft from aggregated databasesLateral movement via admin consoles

Typical flow

  1. The service provider's system is compromised
  2. Data aggregated from many client companies is stolen at once
  3. Client companies issue disclosures and notifications one after another

Targeted data: Customer and transaction data of many companies held by the provider

Key countermeasures: Minimize data you hand over, vet providers, encrypt and shard on your side(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Attackers who break in encrypt the data and demand payment in exchange for decryption and silence. Double extortion — also threatening to publish the stolen data — is now the norm; Japan logged a record 123 confirmed cases in the first half of 2026.

Observed techniques

Double extortion (theft + encryption)Backup deletion or encryptionLOLBins (abuse of legitimate tools)Disabling EDR / antivirusRansom negotiation portals

Typical flow

  1. Initial access via vulnerabilities, stolen credentials, or email
  2. Steal credentials and move laterally; disable backups
  3. Exfiltrate data, then encrypt it and demand payment (double extortion)

Targeted data: Customer and financial records; leaked and resold after theft

Key countermeasures: 3-2-1 backups, MFA, emergency contact plans, recovery drills(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Attackers enter through unpatched vulnerabilities in public web applications and edge devices such as VPNs. Worldwide, vulnerability exploitation is now the top initial access vector (31%), and delayed patching translates directly into breaches.

Observed techniques

Web shell deploymentZero-day exploitationEdge device (VPN, appliance) vulnerabilitiesSQL injectionPrivilege escalation & lateral movementAI-assisted scanning + manual exploitation

Typical flow

  1. Scan internet-facing services for vulnerabilities
  2. Exploit a known or zero-day flaw and plant a web shell
  3. Escalate privileges, move laterally, and reach the database

Targeted data: Customer databases behind public applications

Key countermeasures: Rapid patching, inventory of internet-facing assets, WAF(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Attackers sign in with username-password pairs leaked in earlier breaches (credential stuffing) or found via dictionary attacks. Password reuse is the single biggest multiplier of damage.

Observed techniques

Credential stuffing (reused passwords)Dictionary attacks & password sprayingMFA fatigue attacksInfostealer malwareSession / auth token theft and reuse

Typical flow

  1. Reuse credential lists from past breaches
  2. Try the same pairs on other services
  3. Hijack the accounts that authenticate successfully

Targeted data: Member accounts, points and payment data

Key countermeasures: Unique passwords per service, MFA, anomaly detection on logins(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Misdirected sending & disclosure (human error)

20 incidents

Not an attack but a mistake: mass emails sent without BCC, files uploaded with open access. Incidents occur every month. Volumes are small, but trust damage is large; training and pre-send checks work.

Observed techniques

Mass sending without BCCAttachments sent to the wrong recipientsAccidental publication of private data

Typical flow

  1. Send a mass email to wrong recipients (no BCC, etc.)
  2. Leave private data in a publicly visible state
  3. Third parties view or download it before anyone notices

Targeted data: Customer names and contact details

Key countermeasures: Multi-person review before sending, BCC rules, access reviews(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Emails impersonating real business partners or executives lure victims to fake sites where they enter IDs and passwords. Business email compromise (BEC) targeting finance staff causes payment-diversion losses.

Observed techniques

Fake login pages (credential harvesting)Adversary-in-the-middle phishing (AiTM)Business email compromise (BEC)QR code phishing (quishing)Session cookie theft

Typical flow

  1. Send a convincing business email or SMS
  2. Capture credentials on a fake login or application form
  3. Use the stolen credentials to enter the real system

Targeted data: Login credentials; payment and contract approval authority

Key countermeasures: Verify links before clicking, multi-person payment approval, MFA(Protection guide)

Largest-impact examples

Human-error methods — misdelivery, misconfiguration, loss, insider misuse, system defects — are counted in the table above. See the protection guide for mechanisms and countermeasures.

Last 6 months

MonthTotalUnauthorized access Supply chain attacks RansomwareExploitation of vulnerabilitiesAbuse of credentialsUnder investigation / not stated
May 202623606244
June 202626816334
July 202623834113
August 20263611154310
September 20266726518415
October 20262198434912946

Trends in Japan (2026)

Autumn 2026 brought Japan its largest recorded wave of data breaches and unauthorized access. NPA statistics show 123 confirmed ransomware cases in H1 2026 — a half-year record since counting began in 2020. Suspicious access detections reached about 13,700 per day (up ~50% year on year), and phishing reports topped 730,000.

The government declared cyberspace a state of emergency and ordered ministries, municipalities, and businesses to enforce basics (updates, strong passwords, supply chain checks). Authority to neutralize attacker tools under the Active Cyberdefense Law took effect October 1, 2026. Businesses can now consult the IPA's special unauthorized-access desk from the moment they suspect damage, and the PPC has issued alerts.

By technique, supply-chain cascades through shared services and vendors stand out domestically. Compromises of reservation systems, e-commerce builders, and clouds have hit hundreds of client companies and municipalities at once.

Global trends (2026)

Vulnerability exploitation is now the top initial access vector. Verizon's 2026 DBIR puts it at 31%, overtaking stolen credentials. Exploitation of VPNs and edge devices jumped from ~3% to 22% — slow patching of perimeter devices is a worldwide weakness. Phishing is flat at 16%, pretexting grew to 6% as a path into ransom and extortion, and ransomware is involved in 48% of all breaches.

AI-enabled attackers are surging. CrowdStrike's 2026 Global Threat Report ("The Evasive Adversary Wields AI") counts an 89% year-over-year increase. Average breakout time hit a record-fast 29 minutes, and pre-disclosure zero-day exploitation rose 42%. Ransomware variants sharing AI-generated code defects have been observed — defenders are being tested on containment speed.

AI agents now steal directly. In South Korea, AI tools are suspected in attacks on several banks, and security researchers reported an AI agent stealing about 600,000 credit card records. Cheaper attacks mean mid-sized and small businesses everywhere are becoming targets. The Chinese AI systems reported in the 2026 attacks including Japan's are covered in the next section.

AI Abused for Attacks — the Chinese Models "ARTEX" and "DeepSeek"

ARTEX (Chinese AI agent). In October 2026, an investigation by a Japanese company (a GMO subsidiary) confirmed that a Chinese AI tool, ARTEX, was used on all six servers behind a series of unauthorized accesses spanning roughly 80 Japanese companies in insurance, finance, and logistics. ARTEX originated as an open-source AI penetration-testing tool; industry-targeted operations against finance, retail, insurance, and e-commerce have been reported, and its abuse is confirmed or suspected in attacks on major Korean financial institutions and US companies. The developer withdrew it after the reports, but copies have spread and the threat persists. Multiple outlets report that a substantial share of Japan's autumn 2026 breach wave may be of this lineage — timing that matches the ~2.5× month-over-month surge in incidents we collected for October.

DeepSeek (Chinese open-source LLM). In July 2026, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 reported a Mandarin-speaking actor using DeepSeek via the "Hermes Agent" framework to run autonomous attacks combining AI-driven scanning of seven vulnerability classes with manual exploitation. Bloomberg (August 2026) reported that Chinese hackers have intensified activity since folding DeepSeek and other open-source models into their workflows. CSIS had already flagged DeepSeek's weak guardrails (jailbreak resistance, malware generation) in 2025: the pattern of cheap, loosely restricted Chinese models lowering the technical bar for attacks has persisted for over a year.

What the AI actually does. In every case, the AI handles preparation: scanning public services for vulnerabilities, generating and tuning attack code, and selecting targets — the final intrusion and theft still require human hands. The essentials of defense are unchanged: assume-compromise design (MFA, least privilege, log preservation, rapid detection). The AI era does not demote the basics.

Sources

  • Incident data & classification: this site's collection (automated classification of disclosures). Breach database
  • National Police Agency cyber threat alerts (October 2026): www.npa.go.jp and press reporting (Kyodo)
  • Personal Information Protection Commission alert on large-scale breaches (October 7, 2026): www.ppc.go.jp
  • Verizon 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report: verizon.com (PDF)
  • CrowdStrike 2026 Global Threat Report: crowdstrike.com
  • ARTEX (October 2026): Jiji Press, Yomiuri Shimbun, Nikkei, and Impress reportingJiji Press
  • DeepSeek abuse: Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 "Autonomous AI Cyber Attack Campaign" (July 2026)Unit 42; CSIS "Delving into the Dangers of DeepSeek" (February 2025)

Countermeasures per attack method →