ATTACK METHOD
Abusing Credentials — Recycled Passwords at Work
Credential stuffing, password spraying, MFA fatigue, and infostealers: how attackers log in as you with leaked IDs and passwords. Moving to password managers and FIDO2.
Username-password pairs leaked in past breaches trade on underground markets for years, fueling login attempts against other services. The NPA observed roughly 13,700 suspicious accesses per day in H1 2026 — up about 50% year on year — signaling intensified attack preparation including vulnerability reconnaissance. Credential attacks and vulnerability attacks are linked.
Password reuse is what makes this work. For the user, one service's breach becomes a master key to every account in their life. Several autumn 2026 Japanese disclosures included leaked member passwords (hashed and otherwise) and warned about reuse damage.
MFA helps, but MFA fatigue (endless push notifications) and AiTM phishing can defeat it. The global recommendation is not "MFA is enough" but moving to phishing-resistant authentication.
The numbers
~13,700/day
Suspicious accesses observed by the NPA (H1 2026, +50% YoY)
+89% vs 2026
Growth in AI-enabled attackers, incl. automated credential attempts (CrowdStrike GTR)
Techniques explained
Credential stuffing (reused passwords)
Lists of leaked ID-password pairs are tried against a different service at scale. It only works because of reuse — for individuals, making every password unique is the direct defense. Public breach data (including this site's incident records) lets attackers build dictionaries easily.
Dictionary attacks & password spraying
Dictionary attacks try many candidates against one account; spraying tries one universal candidate ("Password123", "Company2026!") against many accounts once each. Spraying dodges lockout thresholds and quietly finds valid accounts.
MFA fatigue attacks
MFA approval pushes arrive repeatedly at midnight until an annoyed user taps approve. Number-matching and FIDO2 make this much harder.
Infostealer malware
Malware families that skim passwords, cookies, and session tokens saved in browsers. The loot is sold in bulk on underground markets, fueling stuffing and session theft. API keys and developer tokens leak the same way.
Auth token theft & reuse
With a session token or API key, no password is needed to act as the user or system. Tokens left in repositories and CI logs leak constantly and connect directly to supply chain damage.
Attack flow (kill chain)
- Reuse credential lists from past breaches
- Try the same pairs on other services
- Hijack the accounts that authenticate successfully
Targeted data: Member accounts, points and payment data
Trends & discussion
Credential attacks run on past leaks, so damage is never one-and-done. The mass of email addresses and passwords (including hashes) leaked in Japan's autumn 2026 wave will feed stuffing for years. Companies that leaked owe users password resets and session token revocation.
For individuals, the highest-leverage moves are a password manager and FIDO2/passkeys on critical services. For organizations: continuous monitoring for leaked credentials (dark web monitoring) and conditional access that distrusts unfamiliar environments.
Countermeasures
For individuals & small businesses
- Use a password manager to make every password unique (stop reusing)
- Prefer FIDO2/passkeys on critical services (finance, My Number, major SNS)
- Check periodically whether your email address appears in breaches
- If an unexpected MFA prompt arrives, deny it, change your password, and report
For organizations (IT)
- Centralize identity (IdP) and adopt conditional access (controls by device, location, risk)
- Monitor for credential leaks (dark web) and prepare forced-reset procedures
- Issue API keys and tokens with expiry and least scope; rotate regularly
- Set lockout and anomaly thresholds so spraying is detectable
Step-by-step guidance by protection level is in the guide →
Abuse of credentials incidents we collected (28, by impact)
| Company / organization | Disclosed | Scale | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 日本経済新聞社(日経) | October 15, 2026 | 1,830,000 records | A |
| チャーム本店 | August 31, 2026 | 370,000 records | S |
| CAMPFIRE | June 1, 2026 | 225,846 accounts | A |
| ウエーブ(Webアップロード) | March 31, 2026 | 176,810 records | A |
| シチズン時計(問い合わせ管理) | October 5, 2026 | 100,000 people | A |
| イノベーション(GitHub) | August 6, 2026 | 62,689 people | B |
| 損保ジャパン(SMILING ROAD) | October 6, 2026 | 60,000 records | A |
| 扶桑電通 | September 9, 2026 | 26,489 records | S |
| ゼットン(forty three旧メール) | March 26, 2026 | 18,553 records | S |
| キャリアデザインセンター(女の転職type) | May 29, 2026 | 18,253 people | S |
| 楽天ドライブ | October 5, 2026 | 15,382 accounts | SS |
| 株式会社ビジュアルアーツ | June 3, 2026 | 6,017 records | S |
All 16 remaining incidents in the database →
Related attack methods
Attack Methods & Trends (Verizon DBIR 2026, CrowdStrike GTR 2026, NPA / Kyodo, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and others). For individual incidents, see the source links on each incident page.