ATTACK METHOD
Ransomware — Record Highs in Japan, 29 Minutes Worldwide
Double extortion, backup destruction, LOLBins, and EDR tampering explained. NPA statistics (123 cases in H1 2026), CrowdStrike's 29-minute breakout time, and countermeasures.
Ransomware holds data hostage for money, and in 2026 it remains the costliest cybercrime in Japan and worldwide. The NPA confirmed 123 cases in the first half of 2026 — the highest half-year since tracking began in 2020. Of those, 31 hit large enterprises; over half took more than a month to recover; 9 caused full business shutdowns; and 60% exceeded ¥10 million in damages.
Globally, ransomware is involved in 48% of all data breaches (DBIR 2026). CrowdStrike's GTR 2026 puts the average breakout time — intrusion to lateral movement — at a record-fast 29 minutes. "React after noticing" no longer works; peacetime design and automated detection decide survival.
Techniques keep evolving: double extortion (steal then threaten to publish) is standard; backups are destroyed first; security software is disabled; legitimate admin tools are abused (LOLBins) to frustrate recovery and investigation.
The numbers
123
Confirmed cases in Japan, H1 2026 (NPA; record half-year)
48%
Share of breaches worldwide involving ransomware (DBIR 2026)
29 min
Average breakout time, fastest on record (CrowdStrike GTR 2026)
Techniques explained
Double extortion (theft + encryption)
Data is exfiltrated before encryption, and attackers demand payment twice — for decryption and for non-publication. Standard on modern ransomware; paying doesn't guarantee suppression. Stolen personal data also fuels secondary fraud.
Backup deletion or encryption
The lifeline of recovery is hunted down and destroyed before the main encryption. Backups on the same network are easily neutralized — 3-2-1 (3 copies, 2 media, 1 off-site) remains the rule.
LOLBins (abuse of legitimate tools)
Instead of dropping malware, attackers use built-in Windows administration tools (PowerShell etc.) to move and disable. Antivirus rarely flags them; spotting abnormal usage in logs is essential.
Disabling EDR / antivirus
Right after intrusion, attackers stop endpoint detection and antivirus before encrypting. Treating the act of stopping security tools itself as a top-priority alert works well.
Ransom negotiation portals
Each victim gets a dedicated negotiation page with chat, amounts, and deadlines — evidence of ransomware-as-a-service with affiliates. Some groups negotiate in Japanese; consult police and specialists first.
Attack flow (kill chain)
- Initial access via vulnerabilities, stolen credentials, or email
- Steal credentials and move laterally; disable backups
- Exfiltrate data, then encrypt it and demand payment (double extortion)
Targeted data: Customer and financial records; leaked and resold after theft
Trends & discussion
In October 2026, Japan's Active Cyberdefense Law gave the government authority to neutralize attacker infrastructure. Businesses now have the IPA's special unauthorized-access consultation desk. Don't isolate yourself — early contact with specialists decides recovery speed.
Ransomware's entry points are continuous with other methods (vulnerabilities, credentials, phishing). Entry controls (patching, strong authentication, email defense) plus exit controls (backups, segmentation, drills) are ransomware defense. Run a tabletop exercise at least once a year — decide who calls whom, when.
Countermeasures
For individuals & small businesses
- Keep critical data in both cloud sync and external media (personal 3-2-1)
- If an unexpected ransom demand arrives, don't pay — consult police or the consumer hotline
- When you see breach news, stop reusing the password you used on that service
For organizations (IT)
- 3-2-1 backups (3 copies, 2 media, 1 offline/off-site) with regular recovery drills
- Universal MFA and privileged account management (PAM) to slow lateral movement
- Deploy EDR; make security-tool shutdown and mass encryption top-priority alerts
- Document the first hours (executives, legal, PR, police, IPA) and rehearse roles and contacts
Step-by-step guidance by protection level is in the guide →
Ransomware incidents we collected (46, by impact)
| Company / organization | Disclosed | Scale | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| ライドオンエクスプレス(『銀のさら・釜寅・すし上等』公式サイト・公式アプリ) | October 12, 2026 | 6,500,000 records | SS |
| アフラック生命保険 | June 29, 2026 | 4,400,000 people | S |
| アサヒグループホールディングス | July 16, 2026 | 1,525,000 records | S |
| CKCネットワーク株式会社、株式会社学参 | June 9, 2026 | 664,000 records | B |
| イズミ(ゆめオンライン・ゆめデリバリー) | October 13, 2026 | 400,000 records | A |
| エネサンスグループ | May 10, 2026 | 365,000 records | A |
| あなぶきハウジンググループ | May 20, 2026 | 207,773 records | S |
| エフワン | April 7, 2026 | 170,000 records | B |
| ロジックベイン | August 16, 2026 | 97,338 people | A |
| ジェックス | August 18, 2026 | 77,619 records | S |
| 教育ソフトウェア | August 16, 2026 | 4,627 records | B |
| 生活協同組合コープいしかわ | April 23, 2026 | 1,756 records | B |
All 34 remaining incidents in the database →
Related attack methods
Attack Methods & Trends (Verizon DBIR 2026, CrowdStrike GTR 2026, NPA / Kyodo, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and others). For individual incidents, see the source links on each incident page.